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Lead Article
The use of various public subsidies and financing to encour-
age hotel development has become widespread in the 
United States.1 Known generically as public–private part-
nerships, we refer to public–private partnerships involving 
lodging facilities as publicly subsidized hotels or PSHs. At 
the far end of the subsidy spectrum are those hotels that are 
owned outright by the public, that is, they are funded and 
owned by a public authority; we call these hotels publicly 
owned hotels or POHs.
The use of public money to either develop in entirety or 
assist the development of a hotel raises many questions. 
This study focuses on one question that is increasingly get-
ting attention and in some cases inspiring lawsuits (Edwards 
vs. Erie County; Milford & Montgomery, 2011; Mirabella, 
2005); that is, how are neighboring hotels affected when 
they have new publicly subsidized competition? There are 
two opposing camps that frequently square off in such 
debates. Those in favor of the POH use a positive externali-
ties argument to claim that the POH is a needed “game 
changer” that will benefit the community by enabling it to 
attract convention and other visitors who otherwise would 
not come without this additional room inventory. These 
new visitors increase spending, employment, and tax 
revenues.
Among the counter veining arguments is that real estate 
speculation in the form of hotel developments is an inap-
propriate role for government. Not only is hotel develop-
ment a risky venture, but POHs are also unfair competition 
that can undermine private sector investments by introduc-
ing non-price competition that can hurt neighboring hotels.2 
Proponents of POHs counter that these public investments 
will actually help existing hotels in two ways: First, the new 
hotel will be a price leader that will elevate prices (Average 
Daily Rate or ADR) for surrounding hotels, second, the new 
hotel will induce demand in a market and attract enough 
new business to create spillover effects that benefit sur-
rounding hotels.3
The Impact of POHs on Competing 
Properties
Despite the importance of how such a property might affect 
other hotels in the market, there is little in the academic lit-
erature to guide policymakers on this issue. Our study is a 
step toward bridging this gap. In this study, we identified 33 
hotels owned outright by the public; a not-for-profit corpo-
ration or other agency of the sponsoring government gener-
ally holds the title of the hotel and is responsible for 
engaging the hotel developer and operator (Hazinski, 2004). 
We use an event study methodology, asking whether perfor-
mance of hotels competitive with the POH changes after its 
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introduction, the “event.” The research question is salient, 
and is being raised in many communities. We could provide 
dozens of similar quotes from across the country, but this 
one from Minneapolis regarding a proposed subsidy for a 
hotel to support their convention center is typical:
Minneapolis officials have lobbied on and off for a convention 
hotel several times in recent years, saying that such a property 
is needed in order to compete with markets like Denver and 
Indianapolis for large, national meetings and conventions. 
Opponents, however, say that a 1,000-room hotel would be a 
bad use of public money and would hurt existing hotels by 
flooding the market with additional rooms and creating unfair 
competition. (Vonmhof, 2013)
With very few exceptions, we find that the POHs harm 
the top line operating metrics of the hotels in the competi-
tive set. Our empirical results suggest that introduction of a 
POH to the market is followed by deterioration of key per-
formance metrics of hotels that are directly competitive 
with the POH: ADRs decline, occupancies (OCC) fall, and 
revenues per available room (RevPAR) decrease. Not only 
do the levels of performance metrics decline but also often 
volatility increases significantly as well. The results do not 
corroborate the frequently told story of the rising tide that 
lifts all boats. This has policy implications for those consid-
ering public ownership or subsidies to encourage the devel-
opment of hotels.
Theory and Literature Review
It is widely accepted that the use of public funds to create, 
operate, and maintain a city’s convention center and associ-
ated infrastructure is a legitimate public activity due to the 
positive externalities created by the convention center.4 The 
classic public finance argument is that while the convention 
center itself may be an economically marginal business 
activity, it creates positive economic activity in the commu-
nity that cannot be captured by the center; thus, the conven-
tion center should be a publicly owned or publicly subsidized 
venue. The use of public finance has been extended to 
include headquarters hotels located adjacent to convention 
centers as the private market perceives these projects as dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to finance without the use of public 
funding or subsidy.5,6 In recent years, many communities 
made tourism development a part of their overall local eco-
nomic development strategy and extended subsidies beyond 
convention hotels to other types of lodging.
Public finance theory provides well-established tools to 
deal with externalities when private markets fail to account 
for the benefits or costs of economic activity. The classic pol-
icy prescriptions are to tax negative externalities (e.g., air or 
water pollution) and to subsidize positive externalities (muse-
ums, libraries, sporting venues, convention centers). Stiglitz 
(1988) and Rosen and Gayer (2008) show that subsidies can 
help to provide more optimal provision of public goods than 
relying on the private sector. Stiglitz (1988) uses the exam-
ple of tax credits for the restoration of historic buildings as 
an example of a public subsidy to encourage positive exter-
nalities. Rosen and Gayer (2008) provide the same policy 
prescription, which they call a “Pigovian subsidy,” but cau-
tion policymakers on its use (p. 101).7 Bartik (1990, 2005) 
cites numerous market failures that call for a unified policy 
prescription including the localization of subsidies most 
likely to produce the most good.8
For reasons discussed in Harberger (1974), the estima-
tion of the overall welfare effects of government interven-
tions to correct externalities is more challenging than first 
outlined by Pigou (1932) in the classical welfare economics 
treatment. In the presence of unpriced externalities, policies 
aimed to correct an externality via subsidy can potentially 
exacerbate other distortions in related markets. Theory 
alone cannot shed light on the relative importance of the 
primary welfare effect of a given policy (defined by the 
welfare gain from correcting the externality addressed by 
the policy) and the interaction effects (defined as welfare 
effects that result from the interaction of the new policy 
with other related markets; Bento, Kaffine, Roth, and 
Zaragoza-Watkins, 2014). An empirical investigation is 
needed to evaluate a particular subsidy.
In the tourism sector of the economy, there is an exten-
sive literature on the use of public subsidy, its success, and 
failures. Choy (1991) and Fenich (1992) provide early 
examples of the discussion; Choy focuses on the macroeco-
nomic impacts of planning tourism destinations while 
Fenich is focused on convention centers and their impacts, 
both positive and negative on the urban landscape. 
Tsukahara (1995) develops a theoretical model showing 
that “optional public services” such as museums or stadi-
ums are provided by the public when “their cost is ‘small’ 
relative to the cost of essential public services.” Dwyer, 
Forsyth, and Spurr (2004) note the extensive use of public 
funds in the tourism sector and critique the tools that econo-
mists and policymakers use to analyze the economic impact 
of tourism and tourism policy. Judd’s (2003) compendium 
has entire chapters devoted to the public and private nature 
of cities and the use of public finance to transform urban 
cores in both positive and negative ways.9 Bernini and 
Pellegrini (2011, 2013) examine the impact of public sub-
sidy on private tourism firms funded under a regional policy 
in Italy, a unique laboratory. In both studies, they report 
positive employment growth and output but a decrease in 
productivity for subsidized firms. Rosentraub and Joo 
(2009) examine the relative returns to public investment in 
tourist amenities. They find that investments in sports and 
amusements produced the most significant gains for 
regions, recognizing the importance of public investment to 
stimulate investment.10 Schwester (2007) examines public 
investment in athletic venues with a literature review that 
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shows insignificant job creation, insignificant changes in 
local spending, and insignificant increases in per capita 
incomes from investments in sporting venues.
At the same time, much less work is explicitly focused 
on the hotel industry. Blocher (2006) notes that “(d)espite 
the massive public investment in hotel projects, surpris-
ingly little scholarly literature addresses the wisdom of this 
public support” (p. 139). Boo and Kim (2010) find that it is 
the size of the function space in a convention center that is 
positively associated with hotel stays, not the number of 
show days or attendance. Clark’s (2007) Delphi study found 
that a headquarters hotel is an amenity necessary for a con-
vention center to meet its potential. He goes on to note that 
the subsidies necessary to bring such a hotel to the market 
are an additional cost that many communities do not con-
sider when they build a convention center. Detlefsen (2012) 
suggests that open bidding processes should be used to min-
imize the public subsidies necessary to bring convention 
hotels to market. Gee and Singh (2008) provide some non-
quantitative guidelines that governments can use when con-
sidering subsidies to encourage hotel development, noting 
that “. . . in most instances, government officials have lim-
ited knowledge of the relative costs and benefits of using 
investment incentives” (p. 142). Hazinski (2010) proposes 
using regression models to look at the impacts that the 
opening of a convention center has on the metrics of the 
local hotel market, but does not empirically test the model.
Among those who have questioned the wisdom of public 
support for hotels are Sanders (1999, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 
2005b, 2014) and Laslo and Judd (2005) who question the 
use of public funding for convention centers and hotels, criti-
cizing the practice as being insulated from democratic pro-
cesses while chronicling decades of publicly supported hotels 
that do not live up to their expected financial returns. Walker 
(2003) provides evidence that the opening of convention 
hotels does not generate additional measureable demand. 
Murphy (2005) provides a critical review of feasibility stud-
ies done on PSHs claiming that they are frequently overly 
optimistic about expected performance. Nelson (2006) pro-
poses processes to review feasibility studies for PSHs and 
describes political barriers that make such analyses rare.
Data and Method
For this study, we begin with the universe of 33 known 
POHs in the United States as of 2014. This list was reduced 
to eliminate properties that had been open for less than 4 
years as the event study methodology requires 4 years of 
post-opening data to examine the short- and longer-term 
impacts of the POH openings on the competitive hotels. 
O’Neill (2011) shows that the mean stabilization period for 
all hotel types is 3.08 years, while Hazinski (2004) speaks 
directly to the matter, referencing a 3- to 4-year stabilization 
period for a POH during which “. . . the occupancy and 
ADR of existing hotels is expected to decline somewhat. As 
the new hotel reaches stabilization and generates additional 
room night demand, the occupancy and ADR of competi-
tive hotel properties are expected to return to normal levels” 
(p. 7). Two POHs, the Trenton Marriott at Lafayette Yard11 
and Hilton Austin Airport, were not included because they 
had no competitive hotels in the markets in which they were 
built. The reductions resulted in 21 POHs and hotel markets 
that are examined in this study.
Our analysis explores how the opening of a POH affects 
the performance of hotels that are directly competitive with 
the POH. In the hotel industry, these competing hotels are 
known as the “competitive set.” Monthly operating data for 
each competitive set were obtained from STR Global. The 
hotels used to create the competitive set are those hotels 
identified as the primary competitors by each of the POH 
hotel’s management team. These competitive sets were veri-
fied as accurate by STR Analytics, a unit of STR Global. In 
no case did STR Analytics find that the competitive set used 
by the POH management team was inappropriate.12 To be 
clear, this study does not analyze other impacts of POHs 
beyond their impact on the competitive set, such as the direct 
tax benefits, employment, and other positive externalities.
The performance metrics used in this study are the 
monthly averages for the ADR, OCC percentage, and the 
RevPAR for each competitive set. Data for each competi-
tive set include 24 months prior to opening of the POH and 
48 months after the opening of the POH.13 STR Global pro-
vides data for the competitive set as if it were a single hotel; 
no individual hotel data are available.
Next, the metrics for each competitive set were indexed 
to the same metrics for the entire U.S. market. Travel and 
hotel performance are greatly influenced by the health of 
the economy. To identify whether the changes in the perfor-
mance metrics were the result of the new POH entering the 
local market or the result of larger trends in the economy, 
the data for each competitive set were indexed to the perfor-
mance of the entire U.S. hotel market using the U.S. national 
data from the STR Global database. The index is the ratio of 
a given competitive set metric (e.g., RevPAR) to the national 
data on the metric (in this case, RevPAR). For example, in a 
month, in which a competitive set’s occupancy is 77% and 
the national occupancy is 70%, the index is 0.77 / 0.70 = 
1.10; that is, the competitive set’s occupancy is 110% of the 
national occupancy. Similarly, RevPAR index of 1.20 
means that the competitive set is 20% better than the U.S. 
market, whereas a RevPAR index of 0.75 means that the 
competitive set is 25% worse than the U.S. market. Indexing 
the competitive set’s performance to that of the entire 
United States, adjusts for the impacts of overall economic 
conditions (recessions, inflation, and events such as 
September 11, 2001) on the performance metrics and thus 
better isolate the impact of the POH opening on the com-
petitive set.
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Our null hypotheses are that there is no impact on the 
market due to the opening of a POH.
H  RevPAR-Index  RevPAR-IndexO1 pre-event post-event: .=
H  ADR-Index  ADR-IndexO2 pre-event post-event: .=
H  OCC-Index  OCC-IndexO3 pre-event post-event: .=
If the POHs produce positive externalities for the hotel 
market, the alternative hypothesis is that there is a positive 
impact from the opening of a POH.
H  RevPAR-Index  RevPAR-IndexA1 pre-event post-event: .<
H  ADR-Index  ADR-IndexA2 pre-event post-event: .<
H  OCC-Index  OCC-IndexA3 pre-event post-event: .<
However, if the POH does not produce positive exter-
nalities for the hotel market, the POH takes customers from 
competing hotels, and the alternative hypothesis is that the 
opening of a POH damages their performance.
H  RevPAR-Index  RevPAR-IndexB1 pre-event post-event: .>
H  ADR-Index  ADR-IndexB2 pre-event post-event: .>
H  OCC-Index  OCC-IndexB3 pre-event post-event: .>
The hypotheses are tested on the indexes for three perfor-
mance metrics using a combination of univariate and multi-
variate methods to explore the hypotheses, allowing for a 
very flexible specification to estimate the impact. We also 
test for market volatility by examining the change in variabil-
ity of the metrics by testing the difference in the variance of 
the competitive set index pre- and post-opening of a POH.
Results
Summary Statistics
The 21 POHs and their markets are listed in Table 1. The 
sample includes POH properties in different states, devel-
oped between 1993 and 2009. Descriptive statistics for the 
21 competitive sets are given in Table 2, showing the values 
of the RevPAR, ADR, and OCC indexes prior to the open-
ing of the POH.
Indices for each market were plotted over time to visual-
ize the data and trends before performing more rigorous 
parametric analyses. We provide an example in Figure 1, 
which is a plot of the RevPAR index for the Baltimore mar-
ket. Note the clearly identifiable trend in the data: The aver-
age level of RevPAR index is higher before opening of the 
POH. The data also show the classic inter-year seasonality 
of lodging markets, a characteristic of the data that we take 
into account in the multivariate statistical tests.
Results of Univariate Tests
We look first at the summary statistics for the entire sample, 
and then examine the summary statistics for each of the 21 
competitive sets. In all cases, the “event” is the opening of 
the POH. The event month is excluded from the analysis. In 
each case, there are 24 months of data prior to the event and 
48 months of data after the event. The whole sample (pooled 
for all 21 competitive sets) results are as follows:
Table 3 shows that all three metrics point to a statistically 
significant deterioration in the aggregate performance of the 
competitive sets after the opening of the POHs. These results 
lend support to rejecting the null hypothesis of no impact, 
rejecting the alternative hypothesis of positive externalities, 
and accepting the alternative hypothesis of damage to the 
competing hotels. However, the unconditional means do not 
control for autocorrelation and seasonality in the data, nor do 
they control for market improvement over time. We control 
for these factors using a maximum likelihood methodology 
that is presented in the following section.
We next turn our attention to the individual markets and 
whether the introduction of a POH had an impact locally. 
Table 4 summarizes the results for all 21 individual mar-
kets, whereas Table 5 contains the detailed results for each 
market.
The left panel of Table 4 shows that the performance 
metrics are inconclusive for RevPAR in 13 markets, incon-
clusive for ADR in 8 markets, and inconclusive for OCC in 
10 markets. In those cases where the results are statistically 
significant, the evidence points overwhelmingly to deterio-
rating performance; eight declines and no advances for 
RevPAR, nine declines and four advances for ADR, and 
eight declines and three advances for OCC. The panel on 
the right of Table 4 summarizes the results for the volatility 
tests: the left column is based on the F Test and the right 
column is based on the Levene’s Test. For the most part, the 
results are inconclusive, although ADR shows a statistically 
significant result in the majority of markets. For those mar-
kets where the results are statistically significant, the evi-
dence points to a worsening in volatility with the greatest 
impact on ADR, where three markets are less volatile and at 
least eight markets are more volatile. No market showed a 
statistically significant drop in volatility for OCC, whereas 
five markets showed an increase. Finally, at least four mar-
kets have higher RevPAR volatility, and no more than two 
have lower RevPAR volatility.
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Table 5 presents the results of the univariate tests on each 
market. The table is broken into three panels, one for 
RevPAR, one for ADR, and one for OCC. Within each 
panel, we report the percentage change in the mean value of 
the metric and the percentage change in the standard devia-
tion of each metric after the opening of the POH. We report 
the results of the t test for the difference in the mean value 
of the metric before and after the event. We also report the 
results of an F test and Levene’s test for the equality of vari-
ance of the metric before and after the event.14
Overall results are as follows:
•• For RevPAR, 17 of the 21 markets show a deteriora-
tion, with eight of the 17 being statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level or better. Four of the 21 markets
show an improvement in RevPAR; none are statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level or better.
|| Standard deviation shows an increase in 15 of 
the 21 markets for the monthly RevPAR, that is, 
these markets become more volatile. In five of 
the 15 cases, this increase in volatility is statisti-
cally significant at the 10% level or better. Six 
markets show a decrease in standard deviation of 
RevPAR; two of these are statistically significant 
at the 10% level or better.
•• For ADR, 14 of the 21 markets show a deterioration,
with nine of the 14 being statistically significant at
the 10% level or better. Seven of the declines are
larger than 10% in magnitude (all statistically sig-
nificant at 1% level or better). Seven of the 21 mar-
kets show an improvement in ADR, with four of the
seven being statistically significant at the 10% level
or better.
|| Standard deviation shows an increase in 17 of the 
21 markets, with these markets becoming more 
volatile. In nine of the 17 cases, the increase in 
volatility is statistically significant at the 10% 
Exhibit 1:
Publicly Owned Hotels and Their Competitive Sets.
City/municipality Property name
Opening year 
and month
Property 
room count
Hotels/rooms in 
competitive set
Austin, TX Hilton Austin 2004, January 800 4/1,440
Baltimore, MD Hilton Baltimore 2009, August 757 6/3,044
Chicago, IL Hyatt Regency McCormick Place 1998, June 800 4/5,954
Coralville, IA Marriott-Coralville 2006, August 280 5/602
Dallas, TX Grand Hyatt Dallas Fort Worth 2005, July 298 7/3,246
Denver, CO Hyatt Regency Denver at Colorado 
Convention Center
2005, December 1,100 4/2,790
Erie, PA Sheraton Erie Bayfront Hotel 2008, April 203 5/633
Lombard, IL Westin Lombard Yorktown Center 2007, August 500 6/1,917
Midwest City, OK Sheraton Midwest City Hotel at the Reed 
Conference Center
2006, February 151 5/451
Myrtle Beach, SC Sheraton Myrtle Beach Convention Center 
Hotel (Opened as Radisson)
2003, January 404 4/1,568
Omaha, NE Hilton Omaha 2004, April 450 7/1,832
Overland Park, KS Sheraton Overland Park Hotel 2002, December 412 4/1,143
Phoenix, AZ Sheraton Phoenix Downtown Hotel 2008, September 1,000 5/1,832
Pittsburgh, PA Hyatt Regency Pittsburgh International Airport 2000, June 331 5/1,016
Providence, RI Omni Providence Hotel 1993, December 564 4/1,183
Sacramento, CA Sheraton Grand Sacramento Hotel 2001, April 500 4/1,642
Schaumburg, IL Renaissance Schaumburg Convention Center 
Hotel
2006, July 500 5/1,778
Shreveport, LA Hilton Shreveport 2007, June 313 7/1,090
St. Louis, MO Renaissance St. Louis Grand Hotel 2003, April 1,081 5/2,374
Vancouver, WA Hilton Vancouver Washington 2005, June 226 5/662
Wayne County, MI Westin Detroit Metropolitan Airport (hotel 
owned by Wayne County, MI)
2002, December 404 5/1,841
Totals 11,074 101/36,197
Note. The table shows each of the publicly owned hotels, its opening date, and room count. The last column indicates the number of hotels and the 
room count for the hotels considered as the competitive set to the publicly owned hotel. In this study, we examine the impact of the publicly owned 
hotels on the competitive sets.
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level or better. The remaining four markets show 
a decrease in standard deviation, three of these 
are statistically significant at the 10% level or 
better.
•• For OCC, 16 of the 21 markets show a deterioration,
with eight of the 16 being statistically significant at the
10% level or better. Five of the 21 markets show an
improvement in occupancy, with three of the five being 
statistically significant at the 10% level or better.
|| Standard deviation shows an increase in 11 of the 
21 markets for OCC, with these markets become 
more volatile. In five of the 11 cases, this increase 
in volatility is statistically significant at the 10% 
level or better. Ten markets show a decrease in 
standard deviation, none of these are statistically 
significant at the 10% level or better.
Table 5 shows that not one market exhibits an increase in 
both ADR and OCC. Markets that show improvement in 
one metric uniformly show deterioration in the other metric. 
Another finding is that the whole sample and the individual 
market results show a greater impact on ADR than OCC, 
and one would have speculated that occupancy might suffer 
with the introduction of new supply, but the decline in pric-
ing is more troublesome. The unconditional whole sample 
and the individual market results both indicate that the gen-
eral trend is for a deterioration in the revenues (RevPAR) 
for the competitive sets. The results in some individual mar-
ket do indicate some glimmers of hope, but in no case does 
a market exhibit an improvement in the mean and a reduc-
tion in the standard deviation for all three metrics. The com-
petitive set in Midwest City, Iowa, does see a significant 
improvement in the ADR metrics (higher level of ADR and 
lower standard deviation), but this is not carried through to 
the RevPAR as this market was hurt by lower occupancies.
Exhibit 3:
RevPAR index plot for the Baltimore competitive set.
Note. The figure plots the monthly RevPAR index mean for the entire 72-month sample period. On the horizontal axis are the months representing the 
24 months prior to and the 48 months after the opening of the Baltimore Hilton, a POH. The vertical axis is the RevPAR index for the competitive set 
of hotels, which is the monthly RevPAR for the Baltimore competitive set divided by the monthly RevPAR for the United States as a whole. An index 
value of 1.0 means that the RevPAR for Baltimore was equal to the RevPAR for the United States as a whole. Also plotted are the before- and after-
event means for the index. One can see that the RevPAR index dropped after the opening of the POH. RevPAR = revenue per available room;  
POH = publicly owned hotel.
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Results From the Pooled Maximum Likelihood 
Model
The whole sample univariate results are useful to establish an 
initial estimate of the impact of POHs on their competitive 
sets. Univariate results of the individual markets allow us to 
identify the impact in each market separately, albeit these 
tests are weaker in terms of statistical power when compared 
with the whole sample. The univariate tests, however, do not 
take into account certain statistical properties of the data, 
such as seasonality and autocorrelation. The performance 
metrics exhibit seasonality that is very different for different 
markets, the most obvious is winter performance for Sunbelt 
versus northern markets. Performance metrics may also have 
autocorrelation in the time series, a common property in busi-
ness data. Autocorrelation, too, may be different for different 
markets. Finally, it is likely that a newly opened hotel might 
negatively affect a market when first introduced, but if H
A
 is
true, the market should quickly recover and show improved 
performance over time. To address these properties of the 
data and to control for them, a more detailed statistical analy-
sis is needed. We proceed with this analysis using a pooled, 
maximum likelihood model.15
To rigorously assess the overall effect, we pool cross-
section and time-series data. By pooling the data, we allow 
for flexibility in modeling market-specific effects for each 
competitive set. In other words, we build flexibility into our 
models to account for market-specific characteristics. The 
dependent variable is the index of performance (RevPAR, 
ADR, or OCC) for the competitive set for a given market. 
We estimate two models. In model 1, the index is regressed 
on a market-specific intercept, estimated by α
i
; 11 monthly
dummies for each market to control for seasonality (January 
is omitted), estimated by λ
k
; the post-event dummy vari-
able, estimated by β; and a time dummy, estimated by µ, to 
examine whether the post-event dummy variable changes 
over time. The post-event dummy variable takes the value 
of 1 in the 36 months following the opening of the POH in 
market i , and 0 otherwise; the long-term dummy takes the 
value of 1 in the fourth year (months 37-48) following the 
opening of the POH in market i. Model 1 is as follows:
Performance PostEventDummy
LongTermDummy
i t i i t
i t
k
, ,
,
= + +
+
=
α β
µ
1
11
2
∑ +
( ) =
λ ε
ε σ
k i k i t i t
i i
, , , , ,
.
MonthDummy
Var
The subscript i  on the intercept αi  and on the coeffi-
cients for the 11 monthly dummy variables, λ λ1 11, ,,i i , 
indicates that these coefficients are specific to market i. 
Exhibit 4:
Pooled Whole Sample Results: Unconditional Test for Equal Means.
Measure of 
performance
Index mean prior 
to POH opening
Index mean after 
POH opening
Change 
in mean
Percentage 
change
t 
statistic
p 
value
RevPAR 1.355 1.262 −0.093 −6.80 3.920 .000
ADR 1.236 1.187 −0.049 −3.92 2.938 .003
OCC 1.090 1.051 −0.039 −3.55 4.450 .000
Note. The table shows the unconditional mean of the competitive set indexes for the pooled sample in the 24 months prior to the opening of a POH 
and the 48 months after the opening of the POH. The t statistic is from a simple two-tailed “Chow-test” for equality of means with the appropriate 
adjustment for numbers of observations. POH = publicly owned hotel; RevPAR = revenue per available room; ADR = average daily rate; OCC = 
occupancy.
Exhibit 5:
Univariate Results Summary: Number of Changes in the Individual Competitive Sets.
Change in market performance Change in market volatility
Improved 
performance
Worse 
performance
Not 
statistically 
significant
Markets less volatile Markets more volatile
Not statistically 
significant
F test Levene’s test F test Levene’s test F test Levene’s test
RevPAR 0 markets 8 markets 13 markets 2 1 5 4 14 16
ADR 4 markets 9 markets 8 markets 3 3 9 8 9 10
OCC 3 markets 8 markets 10 markets 0 0 4 4 17 17
Note. The count of statically significant market index changes out in the 21 competitive sets with POH introductions. For the counts on Market 
Volatility, the left column is based on the F test and the right column is based on the Levene’s test. RevPAR = revenue per available room;  
ADR = average daily rate; OCC = occupancy; POH = publicly owned hotel.
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Inclusion of the market-specific intercept, or market fixed 
effect, controls for unobservable characteristics of a given mar-
ket. Seasonality is allowed to vary across markets, by allowing 
market-specific monthly dummy variables as indicated by the 
subscript i. The error term (and its variance) is also specific to 
market i. The coefficients that are common across the events 
are our main coefficients of interest—the coefficient β  on the 
post-event dummy variable and the coefficient µ on the time 
dummy. In this model, the variance of the residuals σε2 is also 
specific to the competitive set for market i.
In Model 2, we control for autocorrelation in the time 
series by adding lagged value of the dependent variable. 
Model 2 is as follows:
Performance Performance
PostEventDummy Lo
i t i i t
i t
, ,
,
= + +
+
−α γ
β µ
1
ngTerm Dummy
MonthDummy
Var
i t
k
k i k i t
i t i i
,
, , ,
, ,
+ +
( ) =
=
∑
1
11
2
λ
ε ε σ .
Like Model 1, Model 2 includes market-specific inter-
cept and monthly dummy variables but now brings in a 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable γ. The coeffi-
cient β  on the post-event dummy, the coefficient µ on the 
time dummy, and the coefficient γ—our main coefficients 
of interest—are common across the events. In this model, 
the variance of the residuals σε2  is specific to the competi-
tive set for hotel i  in keeping with a desire to allow for a 
flexible specification.
In addition to estimating Model 1 and Model 2 with con-
stant variance pre- and post-event, we go one step further 
and recognize the possibility of a change in the error vari-
ance after the event and estimate each of the two models 
above in two different specifications. The first specification 
is the single (constant) error variance specification. In this 
specification, the error variance for each hotel competitive 
set, Var ε σi i[ ] = 2 , is the same before and after the event
(but is allowed to be different across different competitive 
sets, as indicated by the subscript i) . In the two-σε  speci-
fication, we allow the variance of the error for each hotel 
competitive set to be different before and after the event, 
σi Before,
2
 and σi After,
2
. We conduct and report statistical tests
for comparison of the two specifications. We also obtain 
estimates of the error variance before and after the event 
and observe whether they increase.
Exhibit 6:
Univariate Results: Changes in the Performance Metrics and Variability for the Individual Competitive Sets.
Competitive 
set for publicly 
owned hotel 
RevPAR ADR OCC
% 
change
t test p 
value
% change 
in SD
F test p 
value
Levene 
p value
% 
change
t test p 
value
% change 
in SD
F test p 
value
Levene 
p value
% 
change
t test p 
value
% change 
in SD
F test p 
value
Levene 
p value
Austin −8.00 .275 −1.20 .457 .897 6.00 .057 33.90 .066 .08 −11.00 .003 −8.10 .305 .528
Baltimore −16.60 .039 −3.00 .416 .763 −17.50 .000 24.90 .125 .062 1.10 .726 −10.40 .257 .394
Chicago 2.60 .831 4.20 .427 .822 4.50 .442 14.50 .245 .34 −1.40 .663 −1.80 .443 .638
Coralville −1.90 .599 55.30 .012 .053 −0.50 .813 31.30 .079 .153 −1.70 .361 76.70 .002 .012
Dallas 3.80 .515 14.80 .239 .268 3.50 .041 86.80 .001 .008 −0.10 .965 −0.40 .475 .443
Denver 6.60 .308 25.10 .124 .244 −2.50 .352 26.00 .116 .301 6.00 .043 14.80 .239 .52
Erie −8.60 .042 9.80 .32 .74 −2.10 .225 3.10 .45 .966 −7.50 .029 36.30 .055 .227
Lombard −6.70 .101 −2.90 .419 .538 −14.70 .000 69.80 .004 .044 6.80 .014 3.30 .446 .816
Midwest City −0.90 .648 43.80 .031 .117 1.30 .026 −12.70 .000 .000 −3.30 .13 5.60 .399 .467
Myrtle Beach −0.70 .964 13.30 .263 .425 1.50 .887 6.20 .386 .695 −3.20 .519 13.30 .263 .279
Omaha −11.50 .000 9.60 .322 .73 −4.10 .014 10.90 .301 .986 −6.20 .000 13.90 .254 .328
Overland Park −27.90 .000 −38.20 .003 .004 −13.70 .000 −40.40 .001 .000 −10.90 .000 −12.00 .224 .495
Phoenix −6.80 .609 1.40 .486 .75 −1.60 .793 −2.70 .425 .844 −4.40 .463 10.90 .301 .361
Pittsburgh −29.60 .000 72.20 .003 .005 −16.10 .000 229.40 .000 .000 −9.50 .000 35.00 .061 .095
Providence −5.70 .13 45.10 .028 .037 −10.80 .000 38.90 .045 .084 4.40 .023 86.50 .001 .012
Sacramento −7.90 .101 1.30 .484 .728 −7.00 .000 14.40 .252 .344 0.20 .93 −9.40 .294 .827
Schaumburg −22.20 .000 55.00 .013 .054 −1.40 .206 100.50 .000 .002 −17.90 .000 64.50 .006 .005
Shreveport 0.30 .933 −22.90 .065 .203 0.80 .559 −37.50 .003 .049 −0.50 .872 −13.40 .198 .314
St. Louis −19.90 .008 −6.30 .345 .755 −14.70 .000 42.00 .036 .101 −5.50 .185 −3.40 .407 .769
Vancouver −1.20 .547 9.90 .319 .827 3.50 .000 14.20 .249 .837 −5.60 .011 −11.70 .232 .39
Wayne County −22.80 .000 14.70 .241 .634 −12.70 .000 83.50 .001 .031 −7.80 .002 −8.80 .291 .828
Note. For the three performance metrics (RevPAR, ADR, and OCC), “% change” is the percentage change in the index metric (value of the index after the event minus the 
value of the index before, divided by the value of the index before); “t test p value” is the p value of the t test for the difference in values before and after the event; “% 
change in SD” is the percentage change in the standard deviation of the metric (standard deviation after the event minus standard deviation before, divided by the standard 
deviation before); “F test p value” is the p value of the F test for the difference in variance (before and after the event); “Levene p value” is the p value of the Levene’s test 
for the difference in variance (before and after the event). The values in bold indicate statistical significance at the 10% level or better. RevPAR = revenue per available room; 
ADR = average daily rate; OCC = occupancy.
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The models are estimated by Maximum Likelihood 
method, and standard errors are obtained from Fisher 
Information Matrix (inverse of the negative of the Hessian 
for the likelihood function, evaluated at the maximum).16 
The estimates are reported in Table 6.
Table 6, Panel A gives the results for Model 1, for the single 
error-variance and for the two-error-variance specification. 
The pooled model is designed to use information contained 
in all the events and to estimate the impact of the opening of 
a POH on the competitive set. The coefficient on the post-
event dummy variable β is negative and strongly statistically 
significant for all three measures of performance, RevPAR, 
ADR, and Occupancy. The coefficient on the long-term 
dummy variable is positive and is statistically significant in 
five out of six cases; the long-term dummy for ADR in the 
constant σε  model is not significantly different from zero.17 
For all metrics, the post-event dummy is much more strongly 
significant than the long-term dummy. In all cases, the two-
error-variance specification results in a statistically signifi-
cant improvement in the likelihood ratio, indicating a better 
fit. Finally, the use of the two-error-variance specification 
clearly indicates that the variance post-event is higher than 
the variance pre-event for all three performance measures.
Table 6, Panel B reports the results for Model 2 (which 
includes lagged dependent variable to control for potential 
autocorrelation in the data). The results are reported for 
both the single error-variance and the two-σε  specifica-
tions. The results are consistent with those obtained in Panel 
A. The coefficient on the post-dummy variable is negative 
and strongly statistically significant for all three measures 
of performance, RevPAR, ADR, and Occupancy. The coef-
ficient on the long-term dummy variable is positive and is 
statistically significant in only three of the six cases; it 
shows weak significance for RevPAR, no significance for 
ADR, and strong statistical significance for OCC. In all 
cases, the two-error-variance specification results in a sta-
tistically better fit and clearly indicates that the variance 
post-event is higher than the variance pre-event for all three 
performance measures.
The lag coefficient (γ) is strongly significant for all three 
metrics in both model specifications, indicating strong 
autocorrelation. The values of the lag coefficients are inter-
esting as well, and appear to be very consistently estimated 
across the two error specifications; RevPAR and Occupancy 
have a 50%-60% lag coefficient, while ADR has a lag coef-
ficient of approximately 80%, indicating more inertia in 
ADR than in RevPAR and OCC. Finally, the likelihood 
ratios for the Model 2 (Panel B) specifications dominate 
the likelihood ratios for the Model 1 (Panel A) specifica-
tions. We interpret the combination of the strong fit on the 
lag coefficient and the likelihood ratio dominance as indi-
cating that the Model 2 specification is superior to the 
Model 1 specification.18
The results are consistent in all estimated pooled models: 
The impact of opening a POH is negative and strongly statisti-
cally significant for all three performance metrics used, and 
the competitive set indexes do not fully recover over time. 
Table 7 summarizes the economic impact of the POHs on the 
competitive set indices. The top panel shows impacts based 
on the Model 2 specification results, whereas the bottom panel 
shows impacts based on the Model 1 specification results.
To begin, examine the left side of Panel B that shows the 
two-error-variance Model 1 specification. Table 6 shows the 
post-event dummy (β) for RevPAR equals −0.06848, with t 
statistic of −10.41. Recovery in the index is estimated by a 
significantly positive coefficient on the long-term dummy µ; 
for RevPAR, we obtain an estimate of 0.0155636 (t = 2.09). 
We interpret these results to indicate that the initial drop in 
RevPAR is 6.848% but that RevPAR recovers to a drop of 
5.292% in the fourth year (calculated as β + µ = −0.06848 + 
0.0155636 = −0.05292) using the two-σε  specification. All 
Panel B results are calculated in a similar fashion.
Panel A is calculated as follows. The long-term impact is 
estimated as (β + µ) / (1 − γ), while the initial impact is 
estimated as β / (1 − γ).19 Examine the left side of Panel A 
which shows the two-error-variance Model 2 specification. 
Table 6 shows that the estimated RevPAR coefficient equals 
−0.03317, with t statistic of −6.81. Recovery in the index is 
estimated by a non-significant coefficient on the long-term 
dummy µ; for RevPAR, we obtain an estimate of 0. 006847 
(t = 1.11). We interpret these results to indicate that the ini-
tial drop in RevPAR is 7.588% but that RevPAR recovers to 
a drop of 5.998% in the fourth year, calculated as −0. 03317 
/ (1 − 0.561108) = −0.07588 and (−0. 03317 + 0. 006847) / 
(1 − 0.561108) = −0.05998. All Panel A results are calcu-
lated in a similar fashion.
With these preliminaries complete, we examine the 
Table 7 results. The first thing to notice is that the long-term 
impact on RevPAR is very consistently estimated in the 
range of a drop of 5.29% to 6.23%, after initial drop of 
6.85% to 8.35%. The Panel A results are even more tightly 
estimated with a drop of approximately 6% after initial drop 
of approximately 7.5% to 8%. In the Model 2 (Panel A) 
specification, there is strong evidence of a long-term drop 
of approximately 3.5% in ADR with no recovery. The 
Model 1 (Panel B) specification shows long-term drop of 
between 1.5% and 2% after initial drop of 2.2% to 2.4%.
The long-term impact for occupancy shows mixed 
results. The Model 2 (Panel A) specification indicates a 
long-term drop of approximately 1.6% after initial drop of 
approximately 3.7%. The Model 1 (Panel B) specification 
indicates a long-term drop of approximately 2.5% after ini-
tial drop of approximately 3.5%. There is strong evidence to 
indicate a statistically significant recovery in OCC in the 
long term. Interestingly, the long-term impact on RevPAR 
is greater than what one finds by multiplying the ADR and 
358 
E
xh
ib
it
 7
:
P
o
o
le
d 
E
st
im
at
es
 F
ro
m
 A
ll 
C
o
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
 S
et
s.
Pa
ne
l A
: M
od
el
 1
 (
no
 la
gg
ed
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e)
.
Po
st
-e
ve
nt
 d
um
m
y 
β
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
 d
um
m
y 
µ
Sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
(C
on
st
an
t 
σ
ε
 v
s.
 t
w
o-
σ
ε)
M
ea
su
re
C
on
st
an
t 
σ
ε
m
od
el
T
w
o-
σ
ε
 m
od
el
C
on
st
an
t 
σ
ε
 m
od
el
T
w
o-
σ
ε
 m
od
el
L C
on
st
σ
L T
w
o
σ
χ 12
L
L
R
U
R
−
(
)
p 
va
lu
e 
χ 12 (
) A
vg
. E
ffe
ct
 o
n 
σ
ε
R
ev
PA
R
−
0.
07
68
8
(0
.0
06
05
12
)
t =
 −
12
.7
1*
**
−
0.
06
84
8
(0
.0
06
57
66
)
t =
 −
10
.4
1*
**
0.
01
52
52
3
(0
.0
07
47
44
)
t =
 2
.0
4*
*
0.
01
55
63
6
(0
.0
07
44
48
)
t =
 2
.0
9*
*
1,
25
4.
69
1,
34
0.
13
17
0.
89
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
A
D
R
−
0.
02
43
7
(0
.0
03
32
86
)
t =
 −
7.
32
**
*
−
0.
02
18
0
(0
.0
03
84
63
)
t =
 −
5.
67
**
*
0.
00
39
4
(0
.0
04
28
61
)
t =
 0
.9
2
0.
00
72
17
79
(0
.0
03
93
50
)
t =
 1
.8
3*
*
2,
15
7.
69
2,
31
2.
58
30
9.
79
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
O
C
C
−
0.
03
65
8
(0
.0
04
34
09
)
t =
 −
8.
43
**
*
−
0.
03
50
4
(0
.0
04
50
03
)
t =
 −
7.
79
**
*
0.
01
43
44
7
(0
.0
05
46
82
)
t =
 2
.6
2*
**
0.
00
87
82
15
(0
.0
05
61
90
)
t =
1.
56
*
1,
86
8.
34
1,
93
9.
09
14
1.
50
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
Pa
ne
l B
: M
od
el
 2
 (
in
cl
ud
es
 la
gg
ed
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e)
.
Po
st
-e
ve
nt
 d
um
m
y 
β
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
 d
um
m
y 
µ
La
g 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 γ
M
od
el
 c
om
pa
ri
so
n 
(c
on
st
an
t 
σ
ε
 v
s.
 t
w
o-
σ
ε)
M
ea
su
re
C
on
st
an
t
σ
ε
 m
od
el
T
w
o-
σ
ε
 m
od
el
C
on
st
an
t
σ
ε
 m
od
el
T
w
o-
σ
ε
 m
od
el
C
on
st
an
t
σ
ε
 m
od
el
T
w
o-
σ
ε
m
od
el
L C
on
st
σ
L T
w
o
σ
χ 12
R
U
R
L
L
−
(
)
p 
va
lu
e 
χ 12 (
)A
vg
. E
ffe
ct
 o
n 
σ
ε
R
ev
PA
R
−
0.
03
54
8 
(0
.0
04
94
2)
t =
 −
7.
18
**
*
−
0.
03
31
7
(0
.0
04
87
1)
t =
 −
6.
81
**
*
0.
00
89
31
(0
. 0
05
81
2)
t =
 1
.5
3*
0.
00
68
47
(0
. 0
06
16
0)
t =
 1
.1
1
0.
57
38
26
(0
.0
22
59
)
t =
 2
5.
39
**
*
0.
56
11
08
(0
.0
24
74
)
t =
 2
2.
68
**
*
1,
50
0.
74
1,
54
2.
55
 8
5.
61
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
A
D
R
−
0.
 0
05
91
(0
.0
02
05
9)
t =
 −
2.
81
**
*
−
0.
00
65
26
  
(0
.0
02
24
9)
t =
 −
2.
90
**
*
−
0.
00
08
19
7 
(0
.0
02
55
3)
t =
 −
0.
32
−
0.
00
02
60
8
(0
.0
02
45
93
)
t =
 −
0.
11
0.
80
63
24
(0
.0
16
86
)
t =
 4
7.
82
**
*
0.
81
36
71
(0
.0
17
06
)
t =
 4
7.
76
**
*
2,
70
9.
72
2,
77
1.
47
12
3.
50
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
O
C
C
−
0.
01
80
8
(0
.0
03
70
1)
t =
 −
4.
88
**
*
−
0.
 0
17
56
(0
.0
03
74
7)
t =
 −
4.
68
**
*
0.
01
04
02
(0
.0
04
58
4)
t =
 2
.2
7*
*
0.
00
96
93
(0
.0
04
79
1)
t =
 2
.0
2*
*
0.
52
01
74
(0
.0
23
95
4)
t =
 2
1.
72
**
*
0.
52
12
03
(0
.0
25
33
6)
t =
 2
0.
57
**
*
2,
04
4.
27
2,
08
6.
55
85
.5
7
0.
00
0
In
cr
ea
se
N
ot
e.
 T
w
o 
m
od
el
s 
in
 t
w
o 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 e
ac
h 
ar
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 w
ith
 d
at
a 
fo
r 
al
l h
ot
el
s 
po
ol
ed
. M
od
el
 1
 (
Pa
ne
l A
) 
do
es
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e 
la
gg
ed
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e,
 a
nd
 M
od
el
 2
 (
Pa
ne
l B
) 
in
cl
ud
es
 la
gg
ed
 
de
pe
nd
en
t 
va
ri
ab
le
. E
ac
h 
m
od
el
 is
 e
st
im
at
ed
 in
 t
w
o 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
: w
ith
 c
on
st
an
t 
(p
er
 h
ot
el
) 
er
ro
r 
va
ri
an
ce
, a
nd
 w
ith
 d
iff
er
en
t 
er
ro
r 
va
ri
an
ce
s 
(fo
r 
ea
ch
 h
ot
el
) 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 a
ft
er
 t
he
 e
ve
nt
. T
he
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
te
st
s 
fo
r 
co
m
pa
ri
so
n 
of
 t
he
 s
in
gl
e-
va
ri
an
ce
 a
nd
 t
w
o-
va
ri
an
ce
 s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
. T
he
 t
es
ts
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
χ2
 s
ta
tis
tic
 r
ej
ec
t 
th
e 
si
ng
le
-v
ar
ia
nc
e 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
in
 fa
vo
r 
of
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
be
fo
re
- 
an
d 
af
te
r-
ev
en
t 
er
ro
r 
va
ri
an
ce
s.
 E
xa
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 e
rr
or
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
es
tim
at
es
 s
ho
w
s 
th
at
 t
he
 v
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 t
he
 e
rr
or
 t
er
m
 (
on
 a
ve
ra
ge
, a
cr
os
s 
ev
en
ts
) 
is
 h
ig
he
r 
in
 t
he
 p
os
t-
ev
en
t 
pe
ri
od
 t
ha
n 
in
 t
he
 p
re
-
ev
en
t 
pe
ri
od
. A
s 
a 
fu
rt
he
r 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
 c
he
ck
, t
he
 a
ut
ho
rs
 e
st
im
at
ed
 t
w
o 
ad
di
tio
na
l s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
 fo
r 
th
e 
lo
ng
-t
er
m
 d
um
m
y.
 T
ab
le
 6
 p
re
se
nt
s 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 fo
r 
a 
lo
ng
-t
er
m
 d
um
m
y 
th
at
 t
ak
es
 t
he
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
1 
in
 t
he
 fo
ur
th
 y
ea
r 
(m
on
th
s 
37
-4
8)
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
op
en
in
g 
of
 t
he
 P
O
H
. W
e 
al
so
 e
st
im
at
ed
 µ
 fo
r 
tim
e 
=
 ln
(t
), 
w
he
re
 t 
w
as
 t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 m
on
th
s 
th
at
 h
ad
 p
as
se
d 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
op
en
in
g 
of
 t
he
 P
O
H
 a
nd
 µ
 
fo
r 
tim
e 
=
 t,
 w
he
re
 t 
w
as
 t
he
 n
um
be
r 
of
 m
on
th
s 
th
at
 h
ad
 p
as
se
d 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
op
en
in
g 
of
 t
he
 P
O
H
. I
n 
al
l c
as
es
, t
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 a
re
 r
ob
us
t 
to
 t
he
 r
es
ul
ts
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 h
er
e.
 A
s 
th
e 
T
ab
le
 6
 s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
tim
e 
(t
im
e 
=
 1
 fo
r 
Y
ea
r 
4)
 h
as
 t
he
 h
ig
he
st
 o
ve
ra
ll 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
va
lu
e,
 w
e 
us
e 
th
es
e 
as
 t
he
 m
ai
n 
re
su
lts
. R
ev
PA
R
 =
 r
ev
en
ue
 p
er
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
ro
om
; A
D
R
 =
 a
ve
ra
ge
 d
ai
ly
 r
at
e;
 O
C
C
 =
 o
cc
up
an
cy
; P
O
H
 =
 p
ub
lic
ly
 
ow
ne
d 
ho
te
l.
Nelson et al. 359
OCC results, indicating that the RevPAR drop is more pro-
found than simply the changes in ADR and OCC.
We interpret these results as indicating strong evidence 
that the introduction of a POH has a negative impact on 
hotels in the POH’s competitive set, even after adjusting for 
a recovery. Interestingly, the impact on occupancy and ADR 
is not as expected. It appears as if there is some support for 
the notion that the demand for hotel accommodation recov-
ers in markets with the introduction of the POH. Surprisingly, 
the drop in ADR never recovers after the introduction of the 
POH, contributing to the overall drop in RevPAR.
Results From the Individual Hotel Maximum 
Likelihood Models
Next, we estimate Model 2 (two-error-variance specifica-
tion) for each of the 21 markets to obtain a unique post-event 
dummy (β) and unique long-term dummy (µ) coefficient esti-
mates for each hotel; this specification allows for seasonality 
via monthly dummies as well as a unique lag coefficient for 
each market.20
Table 8 reveals that the results are much more statistically 
significant than the univariate results in Table 4, with none of 
the markets showing a lack of statistical significance for the 
post-event dummy (β) and the long-term dummy (µ). Like 
the univariate results, the individual market results point to a 
significant deterioration in performance for RevPAR and for 
ADR. Interestingly, a majority of the competitive sets (12 of 
21) show a statistically significant long-term increase in
OCC, while a majority of the competitive sets show a statisti-
cally significant long-term decrease in RevPAR and OCC 
(13 of 21 for both metrics). Table 9 presents the Post-Event 
Dummy (β) and a Long-Term Dummy (µ) and their level of 
significance for each of the competitive set indexes. Note 
Exhibit 8:
Pooled Results: Impact of Publicly Owned Hotels on the Competitive Set Indexes.
Panel A: Lagged dependent variable (Model 2) specification.
Two- σε  model Constant σε  model
Initial impact Long-term impact Initial impact Long-term impact
RevPAR −7.558% −5.998% −8.325% −6.230%
ADR −3.502% −3.642% −3.053% −3.476%
OCC −3.666% −1.641% −3.768% −1.600%
Panel B: No lagged dependent variable (Model 1) specification.
Two- σε  model Constant σε  model
Initial impact Long-term impact Initial impact Long-term impact
RevPAR −6.848% −5.292% −7.688% −6.163%
ADR −2.180% −1.458% −2.437% −2.043%
OCC −3.504% −2.626% −3.658% −2.224%
Note. The coefficient estimates from the two pooled model specifications from Table 5 are used to estimate the economic impact of POHs on the 
index for the competitive sets. Panel A presents the most flexible specification, which recognizes the significant autocorrelation in the data. Panel B is 
presented as a robustness check. RevPAR = revenue per available room; ADR = average daily rate; OCC = occupancy; POH = publicly owned hotel.
Exhibit 9:
Maximum Likelihood Results Summary: Number of Changes in the Individual Competitive Sets.
Change in market performance
Improved performance Worse performance Not statistically significant
Post-event 
dummy (β)
Long-term 
dummy (β)
Post-event 
dummy (β)
Long-term 
dummy (β)
Post-event 
dummy (β)
Long-term 
dummy (β)
RevPAR 4 8 17 13 0 0
ADR 8 8 13 13 0 0
OCC 7 12 14 9 0 0
Note. The table shows the count of statically significant market changes out of the 21 markets with POH introductions using Model 2 to estimate a 
unique post-event dummy (β) and a unique long-term dummy (µ) for each hotel. RevPAR = revenue per available room; ADR = average daily rate; 
OCC = occupancy; POH = publicly owned hotel.
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that the estimates vary over a great range, both for the post-
event dummy and for the long-term dummy. We provide a 
graphical view in Figures 2 and 3.
Of the three metrics of RevPAR, ADR, and OCC, it is 
the first that provides the most complete picture of mar-
ket strength as it incorporates both ADR and OCC. We 
have plotted the initial change and the long-term change 
to the competitive set index for RevPAR for the 21 indi-
vidual competitive sets in Figure 2, using the data from 
Table 9.
The 21 competitive sets are organized horizontally by 
city name. An outcome in support of the positive externali-
ties hypothesis has outcomes above the 0% line, that is, 
higher RevPAR index. An outcome in support of the POH 
damages hypothesis has outcomes below the 0% line, that 
is, lower RevPAR index. For each market, there are two 
bars. The initial change as estimated by the post-event 
dummy is represented by the left bar and long-term impact 
(post-event dummy ± the long-term dummy) is to the right. 
The purpose is to see how the metrics change, both initially 
and after allowing 4 years for market recovery.
One might expect to see evidence that over time markets 
would recover in a way that benefits competing hotels in the 
long run. Although there are some examples of this including 
Austin, Coralville, Denver, Midwest City, Providence, and 
Vancouver, this is not a predominant trend. Figure 2 clearly 
shows that negative scenarios predominate both in the num-
ber of cases and in the severity of the impact. This is true in 
both the short and long-term perspectives. These trends do 
not support claims that POH produce positive externalities 
that benefit existing hotels in the market. The dominant sce-
nario, both in terms of the number of cases and the severity of 
the impacts, is that competing hotels were hurt by the entry of 
POHs into their markets. Furthermore, the data do not show 
consistent patterns of market recovery over time.
Figure 3 takes RevPAR index as a measure of market 
strength and plots it against market volatility to create a 
four-quadrant model illustrating the impact of the openings 
of POH in each of our 21 markets. The vertical axis plots 
the long-term change in the competitive set RevPAR index 
while the horizontal axis plots the change in the competitive 
set RevPAR index standard deviation.
This gives us four quadrants that we have labeled 
accordingly:
•• The upper right quadrant is where the competitive set
index got stronger and less volatile after the intro-
duction of a POH, and is labeled Game Changers.
•• The upper left quadrant is where the competitive set
index got stronger, but more volatile after the intro-
duction of a POH, and is labeled Swinging for the
Fences.
•• The lower right quadrant is where the competitive
set index got weaker, but less volatile after the
introduction of a POH, and is labeled Strikeout
Looking.
•• The lower left quadrant is where the competitive set
index got both weaker and more volatile after the
introduction of a POH, and is labeled Strikeout
Swinging.
If the null hypotheses are false and POHs produce posi-
tive externalities for the competitive hotels, we would 
expect to find observations in the upper two quadrants, with 
the upper right dominating the upper left as one would pre-
fer less volatility to more volatility. If the null hypothesis is 
false and POHs dilute the market for the competing hotels, 
we would expect to find observations in the lower two 
quadrants, with the lower left being worse than the lower 
right due to the increase in volatility.
Our analysis shows that the positive externality scenario 
is very elusive for hotels in the competitive set. Only seven 
of the 21 markets show an increase in the competitive 
RevPAR index, even after allowing for a recovery over 
time. For a POH to be a “game changer,” it would need to 
show a statistically significant increase in RevPAR and a 
statistically significant decrease in its standard deviation. In 
fact, we did not find any statistically significant “game 
changers” in the entire population of U.S. hotels that are 
wholly publicly owned, where there is sufficient data from 
their competitive sets to conduct our analyzes. The Austin 
market shows up in the RevPAR “game changer” quadrant; 
while the change in the competitive set RevPAR index was 
significant, the reduction in standard deviation was not. For 
the remaining six markets that showed modest increases in 
their RevPAR indices in Figure 3, with five being statisti-
cally significant, this came at the expense of more volatility, 
and thus these markets fall into the “swinging for the 
fences” quadrant.
Fifteen of the 21 markets exhibit a decline in the com-
petitive set RevPAR index. Five markets fall into the 
“strikeout looking” category where RevPAR indices fell, 
but the markets were slightly less volatile. Of these five, 
only the Sheraton Overland Park competitive set experi-
enced a statistically significant decrease in volatility. Within 
this category, statistically significant decreases in the 
RevPAR indices were found in Baltimore, Lombard, 
Overland Park, and St. Louis. Nine markets fall into the 
least desirable “strikeout swinging” category where the 
RevPAR of existing hotels in the market got both weaker 
and more volatile. Within this category, seven markets had 
statistically significant decreases in RevPAR indices while 
three had statistically significant increases in volatility. The 
Pittsburgh airport and Schaumburg competitive sets had the 
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dubious distinction of having statistically significant nega-
tive impacts on both their RevPAR indices and volatility 
once POHs opened in their markets.
Conclusion
This study utilizes statistical tests based on several 
approaches: the whole sample univariate statistics; the indi-
vidual hotel univariate tests; a set of pooled models that 
control for seasonality, autocorrelation, and the potential for 
improved performance over time; and individual competi-
tive set models that control for seasonality and the potential 
for improved performance over time. The results from all 
these tests are consistent; there is deterioration in perfor-
mance metrics for competitive sets following the introduc-
tion of a POH.
Given the impact of the universe of POHs in the United 
States on competing hotels, it is hard to make the case that 
any POH generated significant positive externalities to the 
existing stock of hotels competitive with the POH by 
attracting enough new demand to a market where compet-
ing hotels benefited from the public good. On the contrary, 
POHs tend to erode the key performance metrics of com-
petitive hotels in the market. As can be seen in Figure 2, 
there was a significant improvement in the RevPAR indices 
of competing hotels in only five of the 21 markets. The 
pooled models that pull together the composite data of all 
the markets in our study yield similar results. For all three 
performance metrics, in all four statistical specifications, 
the pooled model identifies the negative impact on perfor-
mance of the competitive set.
In addition to the effect on the level of performance, we 
also point out that there is an effect on variability. This is an 
important but often overlooked effect. The data in those 
markets that saw increases in volatility suggest that the 
addition of the POH helped attract enough visitors during 
peak season to absorb the additional inventory and created 
spillover business that benefited other hotels, but this was 
Exhibit 11:
Impact of POH on RevPAR of individual competitive sets.
Note. The figure shows the initial impact and the long-term impact of the introduction of a POH on the RevPAR index of the individual competitive 
sets using the Model 1 Maximum Likelihood method. POH = publicly owned hotel; RevPAR = revenue per available room.
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not the case during the soft season where the added inven-
tory drove down occupancies and rates. Increases in market 
volatility measured by the percent changes in the standard 
deviations of market RevPAR indices were found in 15 of 
21 cases once the POH entered the market. In five of these 
cases, the increased market volatility was statistically sig-
nificant at the 10% level or better. There is only one case of 
a statistically significant decrease in RevPAR volatility (the 
case of Sheraton Overland Park), but it comes at a price of 
a 27% decline in RevPAR level (p value of .000). Volatility 
increases in other metrics too. In 11 out of 21 markets, there 
is an increase in the volatility of occupancy (five cases are 
statistically significant), and there is no market with a statis-
tically significant decline in occupancy index volatility. 
ADR index becomes substantially more volatile once the 
POH enters the market. ADR volatility increases in 17 of 
the 21 markets (in 10 of the 17 cases, the increase is statisti-
cally significant).
The question of how the introduction of a POH affects 
investments that private sector investors made in existing 
hotels has long been an important part of the debate over the 
use of public money for these projects. Proponents of POHs 
claim that their project will be a rate leader that will draw 
enough new business so that competing hotels in the market 
will benefit from these public goods. Others express fears 
that POHs are unfair competition that steal market share 
from the investments that private sector developers made in 
existing hotels. To date, these arguments, both pro and con, 
have been anecdotal with little in the way of reliable data to 
back either side.
For the first time, this study quantifies the impact that 
POHs have had on performance metrics of existing compet-
ing hotels in each of the 21 U.S. markets where there is 
adequate data for analysis. The overall picture that emerges 
from the analysis is one of deteriorating performance and of 
more volatile markets after the introduction of a POH. 
There is only a single market that emerges as a convincingly 
improved case. The data show that POHs tend to harm the 
performance metrics of existing hotels that most closely 
compete with them. Not only does performance decline but, 
in most cases, the markets become more volatile. The effect 
is observed in all three commonly used measures of perfor-
mance: RevPAR, ADR, and OCC. The effects are statisti-
cally significant and economically meaningful.
Exhibit 12:
Percentage change in competitive set RevPAR index and volatility after the introduction of a POH.
Note. The figure plots the long-term impact on the individual competitive set RevPAR index and the change in the RevPAR index standard deviation. 
The horizontal axis is the change in the index standard deviation from Table 2, and the vertical axis is the long-term impact from Figure 2. The upper 
right quadrant is where the market got stronger and less volatile after the introduction of a POH. The upper left quadrant is where the market got 
stronger, but more volatile after the introduction of a POH. The lower right quadrant is where the market got weaker, but less volatile after the 
introduction of a POH. The lower left quadrant is where the market got both weaker and more volatile after the introduction of a POH. RevPAR = 
revenue per available room; POH = publicly owned hotel.
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This article provides compelling evidence that the intro-
duction of POHs harms the hotels that are most competitive 
with the POH; policymakers, governmental officials, and 
hotel operators should proceed with caution and be aware 
that the “rising tide hypothesis” is rarely seen in practice.
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Notes
1. For details on the many forms that subsidies can take, see
Nelson, Baltin, and Feighner (2012).
2. Sanders (2005a) is a good example of the argument against
publicly owned hotels (POHs).
3. See Hazinski and Laubacher (2002), for a classic example.
4. See, for example, Morgan and Condliffe (2006) and Fenich
(1992) for papers providing support for significant positive
externalities argument. Morgan and Condliffe provide labor
multipliers for construction, dining, and lodging as a result of 
increased tourism or convention spending.
5. Rubin (2000, page 4) states,
Hotel development in or near public convention facilities 
has always been a little problematic . . . if a hotel relies 
solely on rooms business generated in tandem with the con-
vention center, it is difficult to achieve occupancy of much 
more than 55% to 57% on an annual basis . . . because 
major meetings and conventions required time to set up 
and time to tear down . . . So the economic viability of 
convention center hotel development has . . . typically been 
seen as something less than a sure based on typical location 
factors alone.
6. Blocher (2006, pages 370-371) provides an example:
. . . A developer may be faced with the prospect of building 
a hotel at a cost of $10 million. She expects to receive $9 
million in total receipts over the life of the hotel from the 
hotels customers. Additionally, the hotel is expected to con-
fer $3 million of benefits to non-customers, including the 
value of spillover business from hotel customers, prestige 
for the town, enjoyment of the building’s architecture, and 
so on. Despite the total gross benefit of $2 million ($9 mil-
lion to the developer plus $3 million to third parties, minus 
the $10 million in construction costs), the developer will 
not build hotel, unless she has a way to collect some of the 
$3 million of public benefits.
7. Rosen and Gayer (2008) say,
Many people . . . understand that if they can convince the 
government their activities create beneficial spillovers, 
they may be able to dip into the treasury for a subsidy. The 
quest for such subsidies must be viewed cautiously . . . 
every subsidy embodies a redistribution of income [and] 
may not be desirable . . . a subsidy is appropriate only if 
the market does not allow those performing the activity to 
capture the full marginal return. (Chapter 8 “Externalities,” 
pp. 101-102)
8. Externalities and effectiveness of subsidies are an area of
active research, both theoretical and empirical. Among recent
papers are Parry and Small (2009), which develops a theory
and empirically tests these in the context of urban transporta-
tion subsidies; an empirical study of externalities in the trans-
portation sector by Bento et al. (2014); an empirical study of
mortgage subsidies and home ownership by Fetter (2013);
a theoretical study of contracting in the presence of hetero-
geneous externalities by Bernstein and Winter (2012); and
a theory of taxation and subsidies in a production economy
by Philippon (2010). Morrison and Siegel (1999) develop a
model of agglomeration externalities and estimate it for U.S.
manufacturing industries, and Harstad (2007) develops a
game theoretic model of political cooperation among regions
that try to internalize externalities. Despite the active research
on externalities and subsidies within different settings, sur-
prisingly little empirical work has been done on subsidies in
the hotel sector.
9. Chapter 2, “Urban Tourism and the Privatizing Discourses
of Public Infrastructure” by D. C. Perry, applies Rosen and
Gayer’s (2008) cautionary note regarding public subsidy to
convention center development, and Chapter 3, “Tourism and 
Entertainment as Local Economic Development: A National
Survey” by D. R. Judd et al., provides numerous examples of
public–private partnerships.
10. In the introduction, the authors state,
The private sector’s involvement in tourism is profit driven. 
When the risks are seen as too great, private investors or 
public sector leaders frequently initiate efforts to form 
partnerships between private investors, governments, foun-
dations, and even pension fund organizations to pay for 
part of all of the costs of building an amenity. The invest-
ments by the public or nonprofit partners reduce the risks 
to the private sector partner and help to insure profitability 
of the project and market-rate returns to private capital. 
(Rosentraub & Joo, 2009, p. 764)
11. The Trenton Marriott at Lafayette Yard lost its franchise,
went bankrupt, and was sold in 2013.
12. As a technical matter, STR Global requires that a competi-
tive set of hotels consist of four or more properties to make
it impossible to determine the metrics of any one hotel. We
used STR Analytics “Comp Set Suite” product to verify the
competitive sets. Many thanks to Carter Wilson and Duane
Vinson at STR Analytics for their assistance.
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13. Enz, Kosová, and Lomanno (2011) use a similar approach to
examine the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the 2008
economic shock on the above mentioned hotel metrics for the 
entire U.S. market.
14. Levene’s (1960) test is an inferential statistic used to assess
the equality of variance for a variable calculated for two or
more groups. It tests the null hypothesis that the variances are 
equal. It may be used as a test for answering the question of
whether two sub-samples in a given population have equal or
different variances. Levene’s test is less sensitive to depar-
tures from normality than most tests.
15. The maximum likelihood approach to model estimation
(MLE) gives several advantages over ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression when applied to our research question.
MLE gives us the flexibility to estimate pooled models with
fine control over which coefficients are identified by the
entire data set versus which coefficients are event specific.
For example, we estimate models that allow autocorrelation
to be different in different markets, and we also estimate
models where autocorrelation is treated as a pooled estimate.
Another important advantage of the MLE approach is the
flexible error structure. Although OLS applied to an event
study would assume that the variance of the error term is
fixed (the same before and the same after the event), MLE
is free from this restriction and allows us to estimate mod-
els with different error variances before and after the event.
Empirically, we find this feature is important.
16. All estimations for the pooled models were performed using the
numerical maximization functions in Mathematica® version 10.
17. As a robustness check, the authors estimated all the models
above with two additional specifications for the long-term
dummy. Table 6 presents the results for a long-term dummy
that takes the value of 1 in the fourth year (months 37-48) fol-
lowing the opening of the POH. We also estimated µ for time
= ln(t), where t was the number of months that had passed
since the opening of the POH and estimated µ for time = t,
where t was the number of months that had passed since the
opening of the POH. In all cases, the results are robust to the
results presented here. As the Table 6 specification for time
(time = 1 for Year 4) has the highest overall likelihood value,
we use these as the main results.
18. As a further robustness check, we allowed for the most flexible 
model which includes hotel-specific lagged dependent vari-
ables and hotel-specific error variance that may be different
before and after the event. In this model, we estimate 274 coef-
ficients in addition to 42 variances of the error term. The model 
allows for event-specific and market-specific characteristics,
yet it is able to obtain remarkably precise estimates of the main 
coefficient of interest. For all three measures of performance,
the estimate of β is negative and strongly statistically signifi-
cant, while the estimates of µ are weakly significant. These
results are consistent with the results reported in Table 6.
19. These expressions take into account the estimated autore-
gressive component.
20. Here, we use the same long-term dummy specification as in
Table 6, which presents the results for a long-term dummy
that takes the value of 1 in the fourth year following the open-
ing of the POH. We also estimated µ for time = ln(t) and µ
for time = t. In all cases, the results are robust to the results
presented in Tables 8 and 9. As the specification for time = 
1 for Year 4 has the highest overall likelihood value, we use 
these as the presented results. As a further robustness check, 
we estimated Model 1 (no lagged dependent variable) for 
each of the 21 markets; the results are remarkably robust to 
the Model 2 estimates, although with lower likelihood values.
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